





The legal system calls upon the jury to perform numerous roles. The jury
is asked to evaluate the factual evidence presented in the courtroom and to
apply legal rules to these facts. The jury also acts as a buffer between legal
rules and community norms and values, and is empowered to mitigate the
harshness of the law.' As members of the community at large and not
employees of the legal system, juries may reach politically unpopular
decisions that are more readily accepted by the community than are the
decisions ofjudges. Also, to the extent that the uncertainty of jury decisions
introduces an arbitrary element into legal decisionmaking, the perception of
uncertainty may serve as an incentive for parties to settle matters by
negotiation.
The jury's basic role, however, is as factfinder; jurors are asked to ascertain
the facts of a case and to apply legal rules to these findings in an impartial and
accurate way. 2 Juries are expected to judge a case based on information
presented at the trial, rather than on prejudices or biases they bring into the
courtroom. They are also expected to understand and apply correctly the
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1. See Schefflin & Van Dyke,Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 51, 71 ("Juries have been able to 'make' law in criminal settings by
exercising their veto power over enforcement of unjust laws and just laws in unjust circumstances.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century in England, persons convicted of violating any one of
over 230 crimes were automatically sentenced to death. [citation omitted] Jurors refused to convict
because, although they recognized the defendant's conduct as criminal, they could not condemn
someone to death for an offense that they felt did not warrant such a penalty."); see also
Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Coi!juries and the Allocation ofjudicial Power, 56 TEX. L. REv. 47,
58 ("The jury serves as a check upon the judge's power in each case. More importantly, however,
the jury's verdict provides the judicial process with a contemporaneous expression of the community
values that bear on the issues in each case.").
2. E.g., In Re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1079 (3d Cir. 1980) ("The
law presumes that ajury will find facts and reach a verdict by rational means. It does not contemplate
scientific precision but does contemplate a resolution of each issue on the basis of a fair and
reasonable assessment of the evidence and a fair and reasonable application of the relevant legal
rules.").
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
legal rules that are to govern their decision. The latter concern is the focus of
this article.
Early research portrayed the jury as a decisionmaker generally responsive
to the evidence presented at trial.3 More recently, critics of the jury have
raised a variety of questions about jury competence.4 They have voiced
doubts about the ability of juries to analyze complex data logically and to
return verdicts based on evidence rather than on irrelevant considerations. 5
Critics have advocated various methods of reining in the jury, ranging from a
due process exception to the seventh amendment right to a jury trial based on
the complexity of the case being tried,6 to less drastic measures like specially
qualified juries7 and rules that limit the information juries receive or are
permitted to use in making their decisions.
This article will examine one type of legal policy aimed at harnessing and
focusing the jury's use of evidence, an approach often called "blindfolding"
the jury." When certain types of information are thought to be unduly
biasing, jurors are sometimes denied access to such evidence. We will
consider the efficacy of this strategy, as well as its possible unintended
consequences.
During a trial, the jury does not receive all available information about the
case it will be asked to decide. The omissions are not accidental. In addition
to strategic choices made by attorneys for either side about which evidence to
present, the jury is often explicitly blindfolded to whole categories of available
information. We will begin this article by describing the range of information
juries cannot be given, and we will then examine some of the limitations of the
traditional approach that attempts to blindfold juries to all potentially biasing
information. In particular, we will explore the ways in which juror
expectations may inhibit the effectiveness of blindfolds or may produce quite
unintended consequences.
3. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 158-62 (1966).
4. See Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 79, 199
(1976); Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision
Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 486 (1975); Note, The Right to an Incompetent Jury: Protracted Commercial
Litigation and the Seventh Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REV. 775 (1978) (authored by Douglas W. Ell).
5. In his August 7, 1979, address to the Conference of State Chief Justices, Chief Justice
Warren Burger expressed concern that the information and legal issues that confront jurors are too
complex to allow a competent finding of fact. Cited in J. CECIL, E. A. LIND & G. BERMANT, JURY
SERVICE. IN LENGTHY CIVIL TRIALS 5 (1987).
6. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970), suggests that courts should consider the
practical abilities and limitations of juries in determining whether an issue is of a legal nature, and
therefore trilble by a jury. Some courts interpreted this note to imply a complexity exception. See In
re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99, 105 (W.D. Wash. 1976); Bernstein v. Universal
Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
7. See Nordenberg & Luneburg, Decisionmaking in Complex Federal Civil Cases: Two Alternatives to
the Traditional Jury, 65 JUDICATURE 420 (1982).
8. Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEX. L. REV. 157 (1954) lists several forms of blindfolding,
among them:
(1) not disclosing to the jury the real parties to the litigation; (2) obscuring the issues so that
a jury cannot understand what they are deciding; (3) discouraging jurors from considering
the effects of their verdicts on the ultimate judgment; [and] (4) limitations on the arguments
of counsel indicating to the jury the significance of their verdicts.
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We will then turn to a discussion of a class of cases in which a strategy of
blindfolding does appear to be the most effective approach. When evidence
becomes so enmeshed in juror information processing that it will have a
biasing effect regardless of judicial instructions or conscientious efforts by
jurors to ignore it, blindfolding may be the only available way to reduce that
effect. We thus begin to develop a prescriptive model that indicates the
conditions under which blindfolding may or may not achieve its intended
goals. Using the available evidence about the consequences of blindfolding,
we will argue that decisions about blindfolding would be better informed by
systematic empirical evidence than by the untested behavioral assumptions
that have traditionally undergirded decisions about whether to deny jurors
information.
II
THE SCOPE OF AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR BLINDFOLDING
The types of information denied to jurors vary across jurisdictions and
encompass a wide range of evidence. In criminal trials, for example, the
criminal record of the defendant who does not testify generally cannot be
made available to juries as evidence of his or her propensity to commit such
acts. 9 While a defendant with such a record may be more likely to have
committed the offense currently charged, the probative value of this
information is. seen as outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect. 10
Similarly, hearsay evidence is excluded unless it meets one of the recognized
exceptions. I'
Blindfolding is particularly prevalent in civil trials. Jurors may not be told:
(1) that a plaintiff who bears 50 percent of the responsibility for his or her
losses will be barred from any recovery; 12 (2) that the defendant carries
liability insurance;' 3 (3) that the parties have arranged for payment of
attorneys' fees; 14 (4) that the award may not be subject to taxation;' 5 (5) that
original parties to the suit have settled;' 6 (6) that settlement offers have been
9. FED. R. EVID. 609. Note, however, that the defendant's record can, and often is, introduced
ostensibly for other purposes (for example, to show proof of motive or identity); see generally FED. R.
EviD. 404(b)).
10. FED. R. EVID. 403.
11. FED. R. EVID. 801, 803, 804.
12. Comment, Civil Procedure: Informing Comparative Negligence Juries What Legal Consequences Their
Special Verdicts Effect, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 606, 608-09 (1979) (authored by Michael D. Heck).
13. FED. R. EVID. 411. While evidence of presence or absence of liability insurance cannot be
offered on the issue of negligence, it can be offered for other purposes, such as showing proof of
ownership or the bias of a witness.
14. FED. R. EVID. 403.
15. I.R.C. § 104 (a)( 2 ) (1986); see Burns, A Compensation Award for Personal Injury or Wrongful Death
is Tax Exempt: Should We Tell the Jury?, 14 DE PAUL L. REV. 320 (1965).
16. Note, Knowledge by the Jury ofa Settlement Where a Plaintiff Has Settled With One or MaVore Defendants
Who Are Jointly and Severally Liable, 32 VILL. L. REv. 541, 549-63 (1987) (authored by Cynthia A.
Sharo).
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rejected;1 7 (7) that repairs were made following an accident; 18 and (8) that a
jury award in a private antitrust suit is by statute automatically tripled by the
court. 19
The decision to blindfold the jury to a particular piece of information is
typically justified on a number of grounds. First, it is assumed that if the
suppressed information were disclosed, it would improperly influence the
jury's verdict. Thus, if the jury learns about the criminal record of a
defendant who does not testify, this knowledge may directly increase the
jury's tendency to convict. 20 Second, litigants anticipating that the jury will
modify its decision in light of the information may be discouraged from
engaging in beneficial behavior. For example, litigants may be less inclined to
discuss settlements if they think that the jury will learn about and modify its
decision based on that information. Concern is also raised that some facts,
particularly those involving the computation of damages in civil suits, are so
complicated that they will confuse rather than inform the jury.2' Finally,
juries are blindfolded to all "irrelevant" evidence, which by definition lacks
probative value and will thus at best waste the jury's time, and at worst
improperly bias its decision. 22
III
Two FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT BLINDFOLDING
A. The Appropriate Baseline
The theory of blindfolding assumes that if a jury is denied a particular
piece of information, it will reach the most appropriate decision based only on
available evidence. That is to say, it is assumed that the blindfolded jury
provides the "baseline" from which nonblindfolded juries would be viewed as
deviating.
This notion of a baseline may be illuminated by considering the rule that
denies jurors information about whether the defendant in an automobile
accident case is insured. The rationale for this rule is that jurors who possess
such information will make inappropriate awards: Juries informed that a
17. FED. R. EviD. 408.
18. FED. R. EVID. 407.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988); see, e.g., Pollock & Riley, Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 498 F.2d 1240,
1243 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975); Cape Cod Food Prod. v. Nat'l Cranberry Ass'n,
119 F. Supp. 900, 911 (D. Mass. 1954).
20. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that the probability of conviction does increase when
the jury learns of a defendant's record. For research on the effect of a defendant's record on jury
verdicts, see Doob & Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect of S. 12 of the Canada Evidence
Act Upon an Accused, 15 CRIM. LAw Q 88 (1972); Hans & Doob, Section 12 of the Canada EvidenceAct and
the Deliberation of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. LAw Q 235 (1976); Wissler & Saks, On the Inefficacy of
Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction to Decide Upon Guilt, 9 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 37
(1985).
21. See, e.g., Brewer v. Payless Stations, Inc., 412 Mich. 673, 678-79, 316 N.W.2d 702, 705
(1982).
22. - 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401.
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defendant is insured are thought to deviate from the appropriate
compensation award because of a "deep pocket" effect that leads them to
award more than reasonable compensation.2 3 Juries informed that the
defendant is not insured are suspected of reducing their awards below their
view of true compensation because of sympathy for the defendant. Implicit in
this view, then, is the assumption that the blindfolded jury will come closest to
the "true" compensation amount that the law asks the jury to determine.
Yet these assumptions may be unwarranted or at least flawed. For
example, as advocates of blindfolding predict, juries informed that the
defendant is insured may increase their awards. Yet this result may actually be
closer to a jury's view of the true compensation amount if blindfolded juries
generally assume that the defendant was not insured and therefore generally
award less than full compensation because they are unwilling to require even
the negligent defendant to bear the entire burden of the damage. Of course,
the legal system may favor such concern about the potential burden on the
defendant as a healthy restraint on a blindfolded jury, particularly if an
informed jury would be more willing to accept weak evidence of causation to
make certain that an injured plaintiff receives assistance. 24 These speculations
about the impact of information are just that: speculations about how juries,
whether informed or blindfolded, might behave. The point is that one ought
not assume that a blindfolded jury necessarily comes closer to the baseline or
appropriate decision than a nonblindfolded jury.
B. The Role of Expectations in Jury Decisionmaking
The second, more pervasive flawed assumption of blindfolding is the legal
fiction that the jury operates on a blank slate, influenced only by what it hears
and sees in court, and uninfluenced by predispositions and expectations.
According to the theory of blindfolding, if information presented to the jury
during the trial can. be controlled, the jury's decision will be based solely on
what the court permits the jury to see and hear.2 5
In fact, jurors come to their task with a wide range of accurate and
inaccurate perceptions about trials and conflicts between partie.s, which can
influence how they assess evidence and make their decisions. In other
23. There is evidence that damage awards against corporate defendants in general are higher
than damage awards against individuals. A. CHIN & M. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS:
WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS (1985); Hans & Ermann, Responses to Corporate versus
Individual Wrongdoing, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 151 (1989); Wittman, The Price of Negligence Under Differing
Liability Rules, 29J. LAW & ECON. 151 (1986). The evidence for inflated jury awards against insurance
defendants, however, is minimal; and if jurors reflect the general public concern about rising
insurance costs, the presumed bias may at least be exaggerated.
24. See generally Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J.
158, 167, 168 (1958); Lloyd-Bostock, Attributions of Cause and Responsibility as Social Phenomena, in
ATrRIBUTION THEORY AND RESEARCH: CONCEPTUAL, DEVELOPMENTAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 271-
73, 278-81 (j. Jaspars, F. Fincham & M. Hewstone eds. 1983) (suggesting that the desire to
compensate a needy plaintiff may increase willingness to find a defendant liable).
25. For the rationale behind keeping a jury blindfolded as to the non-taxability of a damage
award in a wrongful death case, see Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co. v. McFerrin, 279 S.W.2d 410, 419
(Tex. Civ. App. 1955), reved on other grounds, 156 Tex. 69, 291 S.W.2d 931 (1956).
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contexts, the legal system recognizes, and in fact values, the personal
experiences and common knowledge that jurors bring to their task. For
example, jurors are instructed to use their common sense in judging the
credibility of witnesses. 26 Moreover, studies of jury behavior indicate that
such beliefs play a role in the jury deliberation process. After interviewing
jurors in sixteen civil cases and seven criminal cases, Broeder reported that
"particularized knowledge or experience" appeared to affect the course of
decision in eight of the sixteen civil cases. 27 James analyzed the content of
deliberations by mock juries after they had listened to a criminal trial in which
a plea of insanity had been entered in defense of an act of housebreaking. 28
She found that 22 percent of the "bursts of speech ' ' 29 during deliberations
referred to jurors' personal experiences. 30 While she did not measure the
influence of those "bursts" on-jury decisions, over half of the "bursts" were
judged pertinent to the case. 3 1
To the extent that the personal beliefs and expectations ofjurors influence
how they evaluate evidence, blindfolds may be ineffective or may have
unanticipated negative effects. Our discussion below suggests how a
blindfold may permit the jury to reach a verdict based on misinformation and
may bypass opportunities to mold the jury's use of information through voir
dire and jury instructions.
IV
WHEN JURORS SHARE EXPECTATIONS THAT ARE INCORRECT
Jurors hold expectations that influence their perceptions and judgments.
Not all of those expectations are accurate, and when the inaccuracies go
uncorrected at trial because of blindfolding, such false expectations may
influence jury verdicts. For example, jurors may generally expect defendants
to carry insurance that will cover the total cost of a damage award, but the
general rule is that the jury cannot be told whether or to what extent the
parties are insured against liability. 32 Faced with an injured plaintiff, the jury
will presumably be overgererous if it thinks that an insurance company will
pay.3 3
26. See, e.g., the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions (criminal) (Jurors are instructed to "consider all
the evidence in the light of your own observations and experience in life."). ILLINOIS SUPREME
COURT COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, ILLINOIS PATT'ERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL 5 (2d ed. 1981) (instruction 1.01).
27. Broeder, Occupational Expertise and Bias as AffectingJuror Behavior. A Preliminary Look, 40 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1079, 1080 (1965). It did not seem to play a part in any of the seven criminal cases. Id.
Moreover, in a study of simulated jurors' deliberations in response to a criminal homicide case,
personal experiences were rarely discussed. R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE
JURY 84 (1983).
28. James, Status and Competence of Jurors, 64 AM. J. Soc. 563, 564 (1959).
29. A "burst of speech" consists of the successive remarks of a speaker before he is interrupted
by another. Id.
30. Id. at 566.
31. Id.
32. FED. R. EVID. 411.
33. See generally supra note 23.
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If the perception that insurance companies are deep pockets does lead
juries to inflate awards when they learn that the defendant is insured, the
blindfold will only be effective if blindfolded jurors presume that defendants
are not insured. Ifjurors generally presume that defendants are fully insured
for any damage award, and if this belief affects their awards, defendants with
limited or no insurance will have to pay an inflated judgment because the jury
inaccurately believes they will not personally pay the damage award.3 4
While the data are limited, they suggest that jurors do speculate about who
will bear the cost of a damage award. Meyer and Rosenberg studied the
questions juries ask while deliberating.3 5 Insurance was one of the topics
they mentioned, and while they did not report how often it came up, they
used it to illustrate their point that "it is naive in the extreme to act on the
premise that jurors close their eyes and minds to matters that are
commonplace in their lives. '- 3
6
More recently, we asked 192 registered voters in Illinois to consider how
much a person injured in an automobile accident should receive from a
defendant who caused, or at least contributed to, an accident. In the accident
vignette, a driver of an automobile took his eyes off the road momentarily and
struck a pedestrian who had suddenly appeared from between two parked
cars. Respondents were asked to rate the driver's blameworthiness, and to
determine whether he should be excused. They were then asked whether he
should have to pay for the pedestrian's losses; if so, how much he should have
to pay; and the purpose(s) that would be served by making him pay. Finally,
they were asked what percentage of the fault should be assigned to the driver.
Despite the fact that this set of questions took only a few minutes, nearly a
quarter (24 percent) of the respondents spontaneously mentioned insurance
in the course of answering the questions. This result suggests that the
question of insurance was close to the surface for these respondents and likely
to be brought out in deliberations by individual jurors, potentially affecting
the rest. Although this study does not directly test whether concerns about
insurance would have influenced the awards these respondents would have
favored in a trial,3 7 if 24 percent of jurors think about the topic, the
probability that at least one member on a six-person jury would consider the
question of insurance is greater than four in five.38
34. The situation is clearly worse when a defendant lacks insurance, or at least full coverage, and
the jury presumes that the defendant is fully insured. The blindfold produces a verdict based upon
an inaccurate presumption and may stimulate an inflated damage award that the defendant will
personally pay.
35. Meyer & Rosenberg, Questions Juries Ask: Untapped Springs of Insight, 55 JUDICATURE 105, 105-
09 (1971).
36. Id. at 108.
37. Guinther reports results of a survey which asked 286jurors in civil trials if they thought the
defendant carried insurance. Over half (54%) said yes, 8% said no, and 38% said they had never
thought about it. Ninejurors admitted it made an important difference in the verdict, and another 34
jurors said it had a minor effect. Thus, in all, 15% of the jurors reported that beliefs about insurance
had affected their verdict. J. GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 98 (1988).
38. The probability for a 12-person jury would be more than .96.
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If we knew that jurors generally presumed full coverage and gave larger
awards when they held that presumption, blindfolding the jury when the
defendant was fully insured-although it would not remove the jury's
expectation that the defendant was insured-might at least cause the jury to
focus less on insurance coverage. Blindfolding might be justified if the
alternative-informing the jury-would reinforce the presumption and
exacerbate its effect in inflating awards.3 9 In fact, jurors may be given hints
that alert them to the possibility of insurance coverage. They may, for
example, be asked during voir dire whether they or anyone in their household
work for an insurance company. Such a question is acceptable as part of the
demographic profile of jurors that parties generally may elicit to help them
exercise challenges on voir dire. Moreover, people who work for insurance
companies may have prejudices that prevent them from being unbiased jurors
in tort cases whether or not there is insurance. 40
We have just suggested that blindfolding may not eliminate biases
produced by juror reactions to insurance if juries generally assume that the
defendant is insured. Alternatively, directly informing the jury about
insurance may actually increase the likelihood of a well-founded jury decision
because it provides relevant information. Data on the insurance status of the
parties may inform the jury about the interests of the witnesses. For example,
the defendant who has insurance that will cover a moderate award may have
little concern about a finding of liability and a substantial concern about
damages, a fact of some relevance to the decisionmaker evaluating the
defendant's credibility. That defendant would have quite different incentives
in testifying than a defendant who is fully covered by insurance or one who
has no insurance. Blindfolding would deprive the jury of this source of
information.
The potential distortions attributable to juror expectations and
compounded by blindfolding are not limited to civil cases. They can also arise
in criminal cases. For example, when the jury is called upon to decide a
capital case, the jury is constitutionally required to weigh aggravating and
mitigating factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment.
However, the jury is generally not asked to decide what punishment the
offender will receive if a death sentence is rejected. A number of states do not
permit the parties or the court to inform the jury what sentence the offender
would be eligible to receive if the jury refused to impose death. This
exclusion assumes that the jury will make its decision in a vacuum,
39. A potential cost of the blindfold, however, is that forbidding disclosure of insurance also
means that jurors sho.uld not be directly questioned during jury selection in ways that suggest that
one of the parties has or does not have insurance coverage. While creative attorneys can elicit views
on insurance during attorney-conducted voir dire, the growth ofjudge-conducted voir dire may limit
such occurrences. Note, moreover, that few of the jurors (6%) questioned by the Roscoe Pound
Foundation survey indicated that their belief that the defendant was insured came from what they
learned in the courtroom. J. GUINTHER, supra note 37, at 299.
40. Id.
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uninfluenced by the concern or expectation that the offender will soon be
released if he is not executed.
Yet incapacitation is a recognized goal of criminal sentencing, and it
would be natural for a jury to be concerned about the future threat to the
community posed by an offender eligible for the death penalty. 4' And there is
some evidence that juries are concerned. For example, in the Illinois death
penalty case People v. Walker,42 the jury interrupted its deliberations to ask
about the possibility of parole.43 The jury wanted to know whether it could be
assured that the offender would not receive parole at an age when he could
again do harm to others. 4 4
We do not know how often such speculation occurs, but the available
evidence suggests that when it does occur, expectations about the alternative
sentence may affect the probability of a death sentence. According to a
Gallup Poll, support for the death penalty in cases of murder dropped from
72 percent to 56 percent when respondents were given the option of life
imprisonment without parole. 45
Statutes in a number of states provide that certain offenders will
automatically be sentenced to life in prison without parole if they are not
sentenced to death, 46 but the defendant is not entitled to an instruction
informing the jury about that statutory provision. 47  Thus the jury,
41. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 48-53 (1968).
42. 91 111. 2d 502, 440 N.E.2d 83 (1982).
43. Id. at 516, 440 N.E.2d at 90. The jury's note stated, "We, the Jury, were wondering that if
we should find the defendant should serve time in prison-if we have the right and/or authority to be
assured that the defendant cannot walk the streets again-determine if he should receive life or 100-
999 years where he cannot receive parole at such an age where he cannot again do harm to others."
(emphasis in original) See also Moore v. State, 231 Ark. 672, 676, 331 S.W.2d 841, 843 (1960);
Strickland v. State, 247 Ga. 219, 226-27, 275 S.E.2d 29, 37, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882 (1981); Tucker
v. State, 244 Ga. 721, 730, 261 S.E.2d 635, 641-42 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).
44. See also Brewer v. State, 417 N.E.2d 889, 908 (Ind. 1981) (The jury in a capital case
"interrupted its deliberations and inquired of the court as to when the defendant would be eligible
for parole, if a life sentence were imposed."), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122 (1982).
45. THE GALLUP REPORT, Jan./Feb. 1985, at 3.
46. In Illinois, a defendant convicted of first-degree murder automatically receives a sentence of
imprisonment for natural life when the jury fails to impose the death penalty only if(l) the defendant
had been previously convicted of first-degree murder or had murdered more than one victim in the
case at hand, or if (2) the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal behavior or if any one of
several aggravating factors was present. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1 (Smith-Hurd Stipp.
1989). In California, a defendant found guilty of first-degree murder is subject to a penalty of death
or life without parole if any, of several "special circumstances" is proved and at least one aggravating
circumstance is present and not nullified by mitigating factors. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.2 - 190.5
(West 1988 & Supp. 1990).
47. See People v. Albanese, 102 Ill. 2d 54, 78-79, 464 N.E.2d 206, 218, cert. denied. 469 U.S. 892
(1984); People v. Kimble, 44 Cal. 3d 480, 514-15, 749 P.2d 803, 825, 244 Cal. Rptr. 148, 170-71,
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 188 (1988); People v. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 1115-16, 755 P.2d 960, 1011,248
Cal. Rptr. 510, 560 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 884 (1989); People v. Stewart, 105 Il1. 2d 22, 70-71,
473 N.E.2d 840, 864 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1131 (1985). Following a verdict of guilty in a
Louisiana capital case, if a jury has found the existence of aggravating circumstances and those
aggravating circumstances are not negated by any mitigating factors, and if (he jury unanimously
agrees that a sen'tence of death is not appropriate, a sentence of life without parole is required. LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 905.3 - 905.6 (West 1984 & Supp. 1989). However, in Louisiana the
jury must be told that, if they cannot agree on a sentence, the court must impose a sentence of life
without parole. State v. Williams, 392 So. 2d 619, 633-35 (La. 1980).
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blindfolded to the real alternative to the death penalty, may be spurred to
choose death in order to insure that the offender will not be released.
When the jury holds false expectations about the facts of the case (for
example, that the partially insured defendant is fully insured) or about the
consequences of its decision (for example, that not imposing the death
penalty will leave the offender eligible for eventual parole), the decision of the
jury may be distorted unnecessarily. The justification for the blindfold is lost.
To weigh the usefulness of a blindfold against its potential costs, the first step
is to assess juror expectations and how they affect jury decisions. Despite the
substantial attention that social scientists have given to juries, there has been
surprisingly little work done on this topic.
V
WHEN JURORS DIFFER IN THEIR EXPECTATIONS
A jury's first ballot is rarely unanimous, even though all of the members of
the jury have been exposed to the same evidence. 48 Hence we know that
jurors bring to the trial individual differences that affect how they evaluate
evidence. 49 One component of those differences is variation in expectations
and beliefs. When jurors hold differing expectations or beliefs, blindfolding
prevents the court and the parties from substituting consistent information
for these differing expectations. The effect can be to promote uncertainty in
decisionmaking.
One example that reveals the potentially deleterious effect of conflicting
juror expectations occurs in those comparative negligence cases in which the
jury is asked to render a special verdict. Most states now have some form of-
comparative negligence rule providing that injured plaintiffs are not
automatically barred from recovery if they are partially responsible for their
injuries. 50 Some states, however, forbid any plaintiff recovery if the plaintiff's
degree of fault exceeds a specified threshold. In pure comparative negligence
jurisdictions,5' a plaintiff who is 80 percent at fault can collect 20 percent of
his damages from the defendant who is 20 percent at fault. In a few states,52
plaintiffs cannot recover if they are found to be equally or more at fault. In
some states, 53 plaintiffs cannot recover if they are more than 50 percent at
fault.
48. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 487-89.
49. See, e.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 396 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that a less than unanimous verdict permits the majority to ignore the minority's different evidentiary
conclusions); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156-57 (1968) (general discussion of
purposes served by juries).
50. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATFIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1.1 (2d ed. 1986).
51. E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 1411 (McKinney 1976).
52. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-64-122(b)(2) (1987).
53. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6304 (West 1987) (only for damages up to $400 to
motor vehicles; for damages greater than $400, the pure comparative negligence standard is
applied); see aso Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983).
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In comparative negligence cases, juries called upon to render special
verdicts assign a percentage of fault to the plaintiff and determine the total
amount of damages, but not the amount the plaintiff will receive. Thus, when
a jury in Arkansas finds that a plaintiff has suffered $500,000 in damages and
was 50 percent at fault, the court, applying the Arkansas 49 percent rule,
makes no award to the plaintiff. Under Arkansas law, the jury cannot be told
about the 49 percent rule. 54 The blindfold is designed to prevent the jury
from adjusting its fault apportionment to circumvent legislative intent;
however, the blindfold may not operate in the way the legislature intended.
Juries are likely to differ in their knowledge of the 49 percent rule, a difference
that will promote inconsistent behavior across juries if knowledgeable juries
do adjust their judgments about the apportionment of plaintiff's negligence.
Moreover, because the application of the rule cannot be discussed, there is an
increased probability that members of a jury who have heard of the rule will
misunderstand how it affects the case at hand. It is by no means obvious what
the rule requires when, for example, two defendants and two plaintiffs are
involved. Inconsistent interpretations by juries will. further promote
inconsistent judgments.
Even if jurors are totally unaware of the 49 percent rule, a blindfold will
cause verdicts to follow legislative intent more closely only if three
assumptions are correct: (1) that jurors favor a pure comparative negligence
rule in conflict with the legislative plan; (2) that jurors unaware of the 49
percent rule carefully distinguish between 49 percent fault and 50 percent
fault; and (3) that jurors who assume a pure comparative negligence rule do
not adjust the percentage of fault, rather than the estimate of total damages,
in order to arrive at their verdict. We consider next why each of these
assumptions is necessary to justify blindfolding the jury.
The information that plaintiffs are legally barred from recovery if more
than X percent at fault should cause verdict distortions only if jurors self-
consciously reject legislative intent. While research on the civil jury55
indicates that juries with some frequency ignored the old contributory
negligence standard that barred a plaintiff from recovery if the plaintiff was oh
all negligent, no evidence suggests that juries find the 49 percent or 50
percent rule similarly objectionable. Moreover, some jurors may favor the
modified comparative negligence standard that prevails in their jurisdiction.
Fifty percent of the respondents in our survey found that the pedestrian who
was injured when he darted out in front of a car was at least 50 percent but
not totally at fault. Twenty-one percent of those respondents said the driver
of the car should not have to pay anything for the pedestrian's injuries, thus
endorsing a bar to recovery by a plaintiff they viewed as more at fault than the
defendant.
A 49 percent rule that bars recovery when the plaintiff is 50 percent, but
not 49 percent, at fault assumes that the jury's judgment is carefully calibrated
54. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-64.122(b)(2) (1987).
55. Kalven, supra note 24, at 167-68.
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to distinguish between 49 percent and 50 percent. If, however, jurors tend to
select round numbers, jury verdicts will not reflect such distinctions. The
natural tendency to offer rounded percentages was. suggested by results from
our survey. While the percent of fault ranged from 0 to 100 percent, 88
percent of the responses were multiples of ten; all but 1 percent of the
remaining responses were multiples of five. A jury made aware of the
importance of the percentage allocation is likely to pay closer attention to the
decision. If the jury is unaware of the allocation, it is unlikely to be concerned
with the effect of rounding to the nearest 10 percent.
Finally, if the jury expects a pure comparative negligence rule, it assumes a
perfect inverse linear relationship between fault and the award the injured
plaintiff receives. We do not know whether juries determine the amount they
think the plaintiff should receive and then allocate fault and total damages to
achieve this amount, or whether, as the law assumes, each of the separate
judgments-on percent of fault and total damages-is made independently of
the other. A hypothetical illustrates this point. Suppose that a juror suggests
that the jury assign 50 percent of the fault to the plaintiff and set the amount
of damages at $100,000. The jurors expect that the plaintiff will receive
$50,000 as the result of this verdict. Otherjurors object that the defendant is
more than 50 percent at fault, so the jurors agree to increase the damages to
$110,000 so that the plaintiff will recover an extra $5,000 to compensate for
his lesser fault. The adjustment actually fails to accomplish its legitimate
purpose if, unbeknownst to the jury, the plaintiff cannot recover at all unless
,less than 50 percent of the fault is attributed to him. The jury may rarely
explicitly substitute an adjustment in total damages for an adjustment in
percent of fault, but blindfolding makes the prospect of such a choice more
likely: If the jury assumes a pure comparative negligence rule, adjusting
either total damages or percent of fault can achieve the same result. If a jury
member happens to know about the effect of the special verdict, that error
may not occur. The result is an uncertain effect of the special verdict
procedures that divert some juries from focusing on crucial elements of their
decision-distinguishing minority, equal, and majority apportionment of
fault.
A blindfold applied over systematically incorrect or inconsistent juror
expectations clearly can affect the judgments of the jury. Until we know what
expectations jurors hold and how they affect jury decisions, it is difficult to
evaluate the costs and benefits of applying a blindfold rather thah pursuing
some other approach to channeling juror behavior.
VI
INSTEAD OF A BLINDFOLD
Apart from the blindfold, the standard method used to direct the jury's
attention away from biasing information is an instruction that tells the jury to
disregard information or use it for a limited purpose. For example, a criminal
jury is usually instructed to use a defendant's criminal record solely to assist in
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judging the defendant's credibility, but not as evidence that he is the kind of
person who commits such acts. Such instructions may have limited effects if
they simply ask the jurors to forget or ignore information the instructions
have just made more salient, or if the information affects juror perceptions of
other aspects of the case. 56
Beyond blindfolding the jury or instructing it to disregard certain facts, a
third strategy for dealing with such material is worth exploring. Jurors are
human decisionmakers who search for the causes of the behavior they are
asked to judge, and who are aware of and interested in the consequences of
their decisions for the parties and the community at large. The law in some
contexts may be able to deal most effectively with potentially biasing
information if it acknowledges these characteristics ofjurors by (1) informing
them of the evidence or legal rule at issue and (2) explaining to them the
reasons why they ought to ignore or discount such material in reaching their
judgment.
This point is illustrated by the current practice in private antitrust
litigation of preventing the court or counsel from informing the jury that its
damage award will automatically be trebled by the court. Congress provided
for automatic treble damages to punish and deter antitrust violations and to
provide incentives to plaintiffs to pursue such suits. 5 7 Before the early 1970's,
judicial instructions generally informed juries that their verdict would
automatically be trebled.58 Then, beginning in 1974 with Pollock & Riley, Inc.
v. Pearl Brewing Co., 59 several courts of appeals reached decisions denying
disclosure of trebling to the jury. The justification for withholding this
information was that the jury would then reduce its award below
compensation level in an effort to prevent a plaintiff windfall. 60 No empirical
research had tested the validity of this assumption about how juries behave,
although jurors interviewed after several major antitrust cases expressed
surprise and dismay when they learned for the first time that their award
would be trebled, claiming that had they known, they would have awarded
less. 6 1
Uninstructed on trebling, most jurors are unaware that their antitrust
awards will be automatically trebled. In our survey of 192 registered voters in
Illinois, only two knew about the rule; and most were surprised to learn of its
existence. Rather, most jurors expect that the award of the jury will constitute
the total burden placed on a defendant who violates the antitrust statutes. As
56. See infra text accompanying notes 66-72 (discussing situations in which a blindfold is
generally useful).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988); see supra note 19; see, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 314
(1978); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977).
58. E. DEviTr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERALJURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 90.39 (3d ed. 1977).
59. 498 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975).
60. Id. at 1242-43.
61. See Cummings, Anti-trust A4dministration and Enforcement and the Attorney General's Committee
Report, A General Survey and Critique, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 307, 308 (1955) (noting that "a recent poll ofa
Philadelphia jury revealed their dismay when they learned that their already generous antitrust
verdict would automatically be trebled").
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a result, jurors inclined to consider punishment or deterrence as appropriate
responses to antitrust violations believe that their award must reflect those
considerations. It would not be surprising ifjurors were motivated to punish
antitrust violators or to attempt to deter them through a warning message.
Congress had those aims when it formulated the treble damages rule.
6 2 If
jurors, unaware of automatic trebling, already increase their damage awards
to achieve punishment and deterrence, the result is an inflated damage award
that itself is trebled.
We know very little about how jurors respond to the automatic trebling
rule or about the considerations that affect their damage awards. Some
preliminary data, however, indicate that many jurors might react favorably to
the rule, and that concerns about reduction of awards to avoid plaintiff
windfalls may be exaggerated. Respondents in our survey were told about the
automatic trebling provision and were asked whether they thought it was a
good or a bad idea. Sixty-seven percent thought automatic trebling was a
good idea. Fifty-four percent of these individuals cited the deterrent value of
trebling as a factor in their evaluation. Twenty percent reported that they had
based their favorable evaluation at least in part on the trebling provision's
punishment value. Seventy-five percent mentioned one or both of these
values as a basis for their evaluation.
Our survey also included a very preliminary attempt to explore the
potential effects of informing jurors that awards would be trebled and
explaining the purpose of this policy. Half the respondents were asked to
evaluate the trebling rule before they were informed that the purposes
suggested for the rule included punishment, individual deterrence, and
general deterrence. The other half evaluated the rule after they were
informed of the rule's suggested purposes. Providing the respondents with
the suggested purposes of the rule had a significant effect. Seventy-five
percent of the respondents who were informed of the rule's purposes
supported the trebling provision. By comparison, 60 percent of the
respondents who were not informed of the rule's purposes supported the
provision. 6 3 The question that remains, of course, is whether instruction on
the purposes of the rule would also affect jury damage awards. Our
preliminary evidence suggests that jurors provided with a justification for the
rule may be persuaded of its merit and thus be less inclined to undermine it
than has been feared.
A decision to remove the blindfold still leaves open the question of how
the information will be conveyed to the jury. In our research, we tested the
ability of college students to understand a typical instruction designed to
inform the jury that its verdict would automatically be trebled.64 Although
62. At least some members of Congress also intended the treble damages provision of the
statute to encourage private attorneys general to bring antitrust suits.
63. A Chi-square (X 2) test was used to compare the percentage of respondents who supported
the rule when they were and when they were not informed of the rule's purposes.
X2 = 4.12, p < .05.
64. We instructed the students as follows:
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respondents generally had little difficulty understanding the testimony in the
simulated antitrust case, less than half the respondents actually understood
that the court would multiply the jury's damages award by three. In contrast,
when we altered the language of the instruction to convey the idea of trebling
more clearly, the respondents were able to describe accurately the size of the
ultimate award. 65
In general, we need to assess jurors' responses when they are fully
instructed on the rationale for ignoring evidence or discounting facts and the
justification for legal rules that affect the consequences of their decisions.
Based on what we have already learned about the jury, blindfolding will be
necessary in some, but not all, situations in which it is currently used.
VII
WHEN BLINDFOLDING Is REQUIRED
We have discussed above a set of examples in which blindfolding the jury
may not achieve its asserted purposes. The arguments depend greatly on the
extent to which jurors bring expectations and knowledge to their task, the
relationship between such expectations and legal rules, and the ways in which
expectations and rules will influence verdict choices under conditions in
which evidence is denied or supplied to jurors. We turn now to a class of
information for which, based on the available evidence about juror
decisionmaking, blindfolding may indeed be an appropriate policy. We will
first describe two examples and discuss their general theoretical attributes.
We will then attempt to formulate a more general set of principles to
differentiate between that information which is appropriately provided to
jurors and that to which jurors ought to be blindfolded.
Perhaps the most studied and clearest case involves information about the
criminal record of defendants who take the stand to testify on their own
behalf. Rules in most federal and state courts permit the prosecutor to
introduce such information, but only for the purpose of impeaching the
credibility of the witness. 66 When criminal record information is introduced,
[U]nder the antitrust laws, if the plaintiff ultimately prevails, the judgment which he could
be awarded would be three times the amount of damages which the jury finds. But you are
instructed that you are to calculate damages, if any, only upon the basis of a single, not
treble, damages. The trebling of the amount of damages is not part of the jury's function
and is solely a matter for the court.
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANTITRUST CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 188 (citing Sulmeyer v. Coca-
Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1975)). With these traditional instructions, only 10 out of 21
respondents in the first part of our study correctly indicated that the judge would award the plaintiff
damages in an amount three times the size of the jury's damage verdict.
65. We revised the traditional instruction as follows:
Now under the antitrust laws, the judge will award to [the plaintiff] three times the amount
of damages which the jury finds. That is if you decide that [the plaintiflf suffered X dollars
in damages, I will order the defendants to pay a total of three times that amount to [the
plaintiff]. Your job, however, is to decide only on the amount of damages, if any, suffered
by [the plaintiff]. The fact that the damage award will be tripled should in no way affect your
decision.
66. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
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the judge gives a limiting instruction to tell jurors to consider a defendant's
criminal record only in evaluating the credibility of the defendant's testimony,
and to ignore the defendant's record in deciding on the issue of guilt or
innocence. Common sense suggests that adhering to these instructions will
be difficult; much research demonstrates that it is probably impossible. 67
Jurors told about the defendant's prior record tend to convict at a higher rate
than those not told of the defendant's record, particularly if a defendant has a
prior conviction for a crime identical to the current charge.68 Moreover, there
is persuasive evidence that this effect is not a product simply of discounting
the defendant's exculpatory testimony, but rather is produced by the
existence of the criminal record itself.69 Given these findings, replacing
admission of the evidence for a limited purpose with a policy of complete
blindfolding seems appropriate. 70
Blindfolding also seems appropriate in civil suits filed under 42 U.S.C.
section 1983 against police officers alleged to have engaged in illegal
searches. 7' Legal rules permit introduction of evidence obtained in an illegal
search, but jurors are admonished to disregard such evidence in determining
both the liability of the police and the extent of damages. Casper and co-
authors found that despite this admonition, jurors who were told that the
search had turned up evidence of illegal behavior by the plaintiff gave
significantly fewer and lower damage awards than those who were told that
the search had not turned up such evidence. 72 As with the criminal record
example, blindfolding appears necessary to prevent jurors from being biased
by this information.
We have now discussed examples in which blindfolding appears both to
help and to hihder the jury in its decisionmaking. How might we draw
conceptual distinctions that would suggest the conditions under which
denying information is likely to be a desirable or undesirable policy? The
67. See, e.g., Doob & Kirshenbaum, supra note 20; Hans & Doob, supra note 20; Severance &
Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply CriminaI Jury Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 153 (1982); Wissler & Saks, supra note 20.
68. See, e.g., Wissler & Saks, supra note 20, at 43.
69. Id. at 45.
70. A policy to blindfold the jury in cases of rape to the alleged victim's prior sexual history was
enacted in 1978. FED. R. EVID. 412. Rape Victim Shield laws arose to protect rape victims from
embarrassment and other potential consequences of having their sexual histories made public. Such
laws create a "presumption of inadmissibility" regarding the victim's prior sexual conduct, except
when the defendant's need to present such information is deemed by a judge to be so great that to
prevent it would be a violation of the defendant's rights. Proponents of the law argue that evidence
of the victim's past sexual behavior lacks relevance and is prejudicial in that such evidence may
arouse jurors' emotions and/or sympathies and, in so doing, will result in a trial of the victim's
character rather than of the accused's culpability. Opponents argue that the defendant is entitled to
present any evidence having probative value and claim that jurors can be given cautionary
instructions to ensure that they make proper use of the information. See Tanford & Bocchino, Rape
Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544 (1980).
71. See Casper, Benedict & Kelly, Cognitions, Attitudes and Search and Seizure Cases, 18 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 93 (1988); Casper, Benedict & Perry,Juror Decisionmaking, Attitudes, and the Hindsight
Bias, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291 (1989).
72. Casper, Benedict & Kelly, supra note 71, at 104; Casper, Benedict & Perry, supra note 71, at
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answer may lie in the ways jurors comprehend, process, and recall testimony
presented at trial. If a piece of evidence is likely to become so embedded in
jurors' comprehension of evidence that admonitions or other techniques will
clearly be ineffective, blindfolding may be necessary. When this is not the
case, other remedies may be preferable.
Pennington and Hastie argue that jurors' use of testimony often involves
the creation of a story about what happened in the case. 73 A story is a
logically coherent account of what happened in the set of events that led to
the court proceeding. 74 It includes such elements as who did what,
motivations for actions, and the intentions of the actors. 75 According to
Pennington and Hastie, jurors test their stories against the set of verdict
categories provided by the judge and then select the verdict category which
best fits their story. 76 Thus, the jurors' mental representations of the
evidence are the crucial determinants of verdicts. Pennington and Hastie
found that although jurors' recollections of the verdict categories themselves
were not systematically related to verdicts, the jurors' stories were. 77
The so-called "hindsight bias" presents a somewhat related cognitive
explanation that may point to certain circumstances in which jurors cannot
adequately limit their use of information. 78 In their work on civil damage
suits against police officers alleged to have engaged in illegal searches, Casper
and co-authors found that the outcome of the search-that is, whether the
plaintiff possessed evidence of illegal conduct or was an innocent citizen
mistakenly searched-becomes integrated into jurors' recall of testimony.
The jurors are consequently often unable to follow judicial instructions to
ignore this issue in reaching a verdict. 79 Jurors who heard cases in which the
plaintiff was guilty of a crime recalled testimony about ambiguous or omitted
matters in ways less favorable to the plaintiff than those jurors who were told
that the police had searched an innocent person.8 0 Such matters included the
experience of the police officers, the reliability of the informants, and the
suspicious behavior of the plaintiff.8'
To take two other examples which have not been studied, we would
hypothesize that testimony about previous settlement offers in civil suits or
subsequent repairs in slip-and-fall cases might have similar effects if it was
73. Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision-making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 242, 243 (1986).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 244-45.
76. Id. at 244. Verdict categories in Pennington and Hastie's study of a murder case included
first- and second-degree murder, manslaughter, and killing in self-defense.
77. Id. at 253.
78. See, e.g., Fischoff, Hindsight # Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under
Uncertainty, 15J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975).
79. See Casper, Benedict & Kelly, supra note 71, at 104; Casper, Benedict & Perry, supra note 71,
at 294.
80. Casper, Benedict & Kelly, supra note 71, at 106; Casper, Benedict & Perry, supra note 71, at
296.
81. Casper, Benedict & Kelly, supra note 71, at 106; Casper, Benedict & Perry, supra note 71, at
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made available to jurors. Offers to settle, or to shoulder substantial
responsibility for an injury or a repair subsequent to injury might well
influence crucial elements of the story that jurors develop from the testimony.
Neither of these last two examples has been the subject of empirical work, but
they suggest the range of evidence whose biasing effects might be so
embedded in the ways that jurors process and recall information that
blindfolding may be a reasonable antidote.
Thus, there is a range of situations in which pieces of evidence may have a
powerful effect on how jurors construct and recall the total evidence in a case.
Jurors' mental representations affect their application of legal rules in a
fashion that may be impervious to judicial instructions about how much
weight-if any, and for what purpose-to give to the evidence. When
information-processing effects are very strong, blindfolding may be the only
way to deal with the potentially biasing effects of such information. We
believe that more theoretical and empirical work on juror information-
processing can provide a fruitful framework in which to evaluate those
contexts in which blindfolding is a necessary or unnecessary policy to employ.
VIII
EVALUATING THE EFFECT OF BLINDFOLDING IN ANTITRUST CASES
We have suggested a variety of issues that might be fruitfully explored for
proceduralists to better understand the costs and benefits of blindfolding
juries to various types of evidence. Such exploration might employ a variety
of research strategies, including surveys of potential jurors, 82 retrospective
interviews from actual cases,8 3 and experimental designs. 84 We are currently
using several of these approaches to explore the effects of blindfolding jurors
to the treble damage rule in antitrust cases. A discussion of the utility and
limitations of some of our strategies may stimulate work on blindfolding in
other contexts as well.
A. Gauging Expectations
As we have suggested, the consequences of blindfolding may differ
depending on the expectations of jurors. Gauging those expectations,
however, is problematic. For example, if jurors are asked whether they are
familiar with the automatic trebling rule or whether they considered the
defendant's insurance in arriving at a damage award, the question itself may
insert the idea into their minds. We described the automatic trebling rule to
our survey respondents and asked them if they had heard of it previously. In
order to make it easy for people to admit unfamiliarity, we prefaced the
question with the observation that most people had not heard of the rule.
82. As used in this study.
83. See, e.g., A. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY
(1984); THE RAND CORP., THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE: OBSERVATIONS FROM A RECENT
ASBESTOS CASE (M. Selvin & L. Picus eds. 1987).
84. See, e.g., Wissler & Saks, supra note 20.
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Eight percent of the respondents claimed that they had already known of the
rule. Responses to other questions suggest that even this relatively low
percentage was probably artificially inflated. For example, earlier in our
survey we told respondents that a jury in a hypothetical antitrust case had
found that the plaintiff sustained losses of a given amount. We then asked
how much the plaintiff would be awarded. Only 1 percent (two respondents)
named an award that was triple the amount of the loss specified by the jury.
We also asked why respondents identified the amounts they did. The same
two respondents were the only ones who gave the automatic trebling rule as
the explanation. The evidence suggests that most of the respondents who
had claimed familiarity were inaccurate, or at least that their familiarity was
not strong enough to enable them to apply their knowledge. 85
B. Experiments to Test the Effects of Blindfolding
A true field experiment would provide an ideal test of the effects of
blindfolding. Such a test would randomly assign juries to one of two
conditions. 86 Half of the juries would be given the information that the
blindfold would deny them while half would not be given that information. In
the antitrust example, half of the juries would be told about the automatic
trebling rule and half would be given no information about the rule.
Deliberations would be taped and the jurors interviewed to gauge the effects
of the information on the focus of deliberations, the evaluation of the
evidence, and the stories that the jurors constructed to evaluate the case.
Juror recall would be examined to see whether the information generally
subject to blindfolding changed jurors' perceptions and recall of rule-related
information.
Such a true field experiment on blindfolding, in which real jurors in real
cases would be given different sets of information, is not possible. Random
assignment of actual cases to conditions of jury knowledge or blindfolding
about the treble damage rule is not feasible legally, nor is observation or
taping ofjury deliberations. But an approximation of the ideal experimental
design can be achieved by using a simulation in which members of the jury
pool are recruited to view a videotaped trial and then asked to reach a verdict
based on that trial. This approach has been used to study the effects of jury
size 87 and a unanimity requirement for jury decisions. 88 Juror perceptions
85. Retrospective interviews with jurors in real cases suffer from these as well as other
difficulties. For example, answers to questions about the expectations that preceded the trial and
deliberation may be distorted by the deliberation process.
86. For the advantages of true experiments in studies of law, see Diamond, Methods for the
Empirical Study of Law, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 637 (L. Lipson & S. Wheeler eds. 1986).
87. See, e.g., M. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS 65 (1977).
88. See, e.g., Cowan, Thompson & Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors' Predisposition
to Convict and on the Qualit, of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEAV. 53 (1984). While the approach of this
study has the limitations of all simulations, it is generally accepted as convincing evidence by the
research community. The courts, however, have not always been so favorably impressed. See, e.g.,
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
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can be assessed before, during, and after deliberations; and juror reports can
be compared with the content of the deliberations.
By blindfolding half of the experimental juries to the treble damage rule,
we can examine the effect of the blindfold on verdicts. Moreover, we can
observe the formulation of the damage award during deliberations, measure
the amount of discussion spent on considerations of punishment and
deterrence, and question the jurors on the determinants of their preferred
awards. We can also trace the unintended effects of the instruction on
automatic trebling. For example, an instruction on automatic trebling may
influence jurors to give larger awards because it suggests to them that the
behavior was more serious or that the harm was greater. Alternatively, jurors
who are blindfolded to trebling may give greater awards because they think
that juries have the sole responsibility to impose punishment and to provide
for deterrence.
An additional benefit of the experimental method is its ability to test
conditions not legally permitted. For example, to get an estimate of what a
purely compensatory award would be in the antitrust case, we can instruct one
set of experimental juries to give a compensatory award and, if they choose, a
separate punitive damage award.
C. Experiments to Test the Effect of Instructions
If knowledge or ignorance of information affects jury verdicts, the impact
of knowledge or ignorance on the way jurors perceive the evidence may
suggest whether instructions are likely to improve the quality of jury
decisionmaking. 89 If jurors informed of trebling characterize the defendant's
behavior as more blameworthy, so that their entire construction of the
antitrust violation is altered, an instruction on the rationale for trebling may
cause little change in damage awards. If knowledge of trebling does not
change the jury's story, and if blindfolding encourages jurors' inclinations to
punish or deter, information and instructions may remove costs imposed by
blindfolding.
The fundamental test of the effect of instructions, however, is an
experiment in which juries are exposed to instructions that describe the
trebling provision and clarify its purposes. 90 With estimates of (1) the
expectations jurors have about information to which they may be blindfolded,
(2) the effects of the blindfold, and (3) the ability of instructions to control
undesirable effects of the information subject to blindfolding, the costs and
benefits of blindfolding can be more accurately assessed.
89. Severance and Loftus, supra note 67, at 181-82, 191, found that significantly improved
specific instructions resulted in correctly limited use of a defendant's criminal record.
90. Other potential instructions never given in a real courtroom can be tested as well. For
example, mock jurors could receive instructions that do not inform them about automatic trebling,
but tell them that the court will add to the damage award if appropriate in order to punish and/or
deter.
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CONCLUSION
Legal rules forbidding juries access to available information have often
been imposed to improve jury decisionmaking. Such policies are based on
untested assumptions about how jurors make decisions. These policies
ignore the role of juror expectations and beliefs that mold jury interpretation
of evidence and affect jury decisions. We have begun here the task of
developing a prescriptive model that will assist in more effective classification
of the contexts in which policies of blindfolding appear beneficial. Such a
model requires additional empirical research about jury decisionmaking, as
well as the application of theoretical models of the process to the task of
understanding the consequences of blindfolding.

